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The federal government funds a major portion of research and development (R&D) in the
United States, and it is estimated that $61 billion will be spent on federal R&D in 1989)
The mounting intensity of global economic competition underscores the critical role played
by the federal government in the funding of science and technology.
The justification for federally funded science and technology follows the arguments that
government-funded research in science and technology serves to support a wide range of
national goals: to improve health, defend the nation, fuel economic growth, and provide
jobs in new industries. Events such as Spumik and the increased use of science and
technology by government at all levels to solve social problems in the late 1960s and 19"/0s,
the energy crisis, and the growing sophistication of the U.S.S.R. technology account for
the growth of federally funded research in science and technology.
Viewed as a process that includes basic science, applied science, and technology, R&D
is the basis of U.S. improvements in health, strong national defense, and exciting and fun-
damental advances in knowledge. However, in terms of economic competitiveness, it is
important to recognize that, unlike other countries such as Japan, federally funded R&D
in the United States is carded out in a totally decentralized environment. Federally funded
R&D takes place within numerous agencies of the Executive Branch; is undertaken by
thousands of engineers and scientists in academia, government, and industry; and receives
oversight and coordination from both the executive and legislative branches of government.
In recent years, two factors have combined to make certain individuals, groups of
individuals, and organizations question the assumed benefits associated with federally funded
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R&D. Huge deficits and budget constraints are forcing lawmakers to reevaluate spending
and to form spending priorities. Technology has become a critical component of economic
competitiveness. The suggestion has been offered from various quarters that federally funded
science and technology should be viewed as an investment that should produce a measurable
economic return.
Discussions concerned with the role of the federal government in funded science and
technology frequently result in heated debates giving rise to the following questions. Has
the funding of science and technology by the federal government markedly contributed
to accomplishing national goals such as improved health and the creation of new jobs and
industries? Can the impact of federally funded science and technology be quantifiably asses-
sed and compared with other programs concerned with, for example, housing and care
for the elderly? Have the results of federally funded research increased the competitive
position of U.S. industry?. Are the results of federally funded research organized and managed
in such a way that U.S. industry has clear and unobstructed access to these results or do
barriers exist that prohibit its utilization? What role should the federal government assume
in the production, collection, organization, and transfer of federally funded STI? These
questions, while easily framed, cannot be answered in "yes" or "no" fashion. They do,
however, form the basis for spirited public policy debate and scholarly investigation. This
article will attempt to examine them by focusing on the issues and opportunities relative
to STI and competitiveness in the United States.
BACKGROUND
Prior to World War II, the funding of science and technology by the federal government
was limited and was concentrated in a handful of Federal agencies. The federal govern-
ment funded between 12 and 20 percent of all U.S. R&D in the 1930s. All that changed
with war in Europe. Today, the number is much closer to 50 percent.
The World War 11era witnessed increased participation on the part of academia and in-
dustry in government-sponsored R&D. Their enhanced role set the stage for the revolution
in federally funded R&D following the war.
Agriculture, aviation, defense, and health have enjoyed long histories of federal support
and practical success. The success of these programs together with environmental con-
cerns, the energy crisis, and various social issues prompted lawmakers and policy makers
to consider the use of federal funds to stimulate innovation in other industries, but with
little success. Why have these programs succeeded while other have failed? Two of these
programs, agriculture and aviation, are discussed here.
Both are noteworthy for their practical success. Both serve as successful models for im-
plementing targeted federally funded R&D and for understanding the diffusion of federally
funded STI. Both models vary in their use of active information intermediaries and
surrogates.
Agriculture. The assumption that the country derives economic benefit from federally
funded science and technology has been fundamental to government policy since after the
American Civil War. Agricultural science was the first federally funded science and
technology program. It became so with the passage of the Hatch Act in 1887. The act pro-
vided federal funding for research at the agricultural research stations associated with the
land-grant colleges which were created in 1862 by the first Morrill Act.
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For nearly a century, since the passage of the Hatch Act, the federal government has
had a program to support applied research related to improved agricultural productivity.
Policy makers believed that a productive agricultural sector was essential to the country's
well-being, and that farmers could not be expected to do their own research. Agricultural
research remained the largest recipient of Federal support until after World War II.
There is general agreement among public policy makers that the agricultural model was
successful in diffusing federally funded agricultural research to farmers (users), and thus
in raising their level of agricultural productivity.
Aviation. Federal funding for aviation was the federal government's second venture in
targeted R_D. The first consistent federal funding for aviation began with the passage of
the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916 (P.L. 63-271) that created the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) which later became the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in 1958. Fresh from the experiences of World War I and the Euro-
pean combatants' use of the airplane for tactical support, policy makers became convinced
of the revolutionary importance of the aircraft to national defense. Further, they viewed
aviation as a new technology that could change the world and create an entirely new U.S.
industry.
The benefits of this investment to the U.S. aviation industry and the consuming public
are substantial. In 1989, the aerospace industry continues to be the leading positive con-
tributor to the U.S. balance of trade among all merchandise industries, including agriculture.
What factors are responsible for the relative success of this targeted federally funded
science and technology program.'?
The U.S. government has played a critical role in the success of the aviation industry
in two ways. First, the market side of the industry was helped by federal (public) policy
in the form of the Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925, the McNary-Watres Act of 1930, and the
institution of the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1938.
Second, the development side was helped by Federal (public) policy with the creation
in 1917 of the NACA with its congressional mandate to supervise and direct the scientific
study of flight with a view to practical solutions.
If agriculture and aviation stand as successes in terms of targeted federally funded science
and technology programs, it seems appropriate to mention, at least in passing, some of
the more notable failures. The success of federally funded science and technology in
agriculture and aviation led the Kennedy administration to consider other federal programs
to stimulate innovation in other industries. Why? The reason was simple. Administration
officials were concerned about the continued growth and competitiveness of the U.S.
economy and the role of technology in industrial progress. Selected industries (textiles,
coal, and housing) were targeted for assistance under the Civilian Industrial Technology
Program (CITP). The Carter administration proposed the Cooperative Automotive Research
Program (CARP), which aimed at advancing knowledge that could contribute to improv-
ing automotive technology. By any appropriate standards of measurement, both programs
were failures. Why? Why would similar public policies applied to different industries yield
very different results?
Both agriculture and aviation recognized the fundamental importance of the knowledge
derived from research. Both recognized the need to link producer and user with the
knowledge derived from research. Both linked science and technology policy to STI policy.
Both placed equal weight on innovation and knowledge utilization. Both invested heavily
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in the support of utilization and diffusion of research results. Both employed active infor-
mation dissemination programs.
The underutilization of technical knowledge rather than the utilization of technical
knowledge constitutes the critical policy issue associated with federally funded science and
technology programs. Other reasons notwithstanding, the common element associated with
less than successful targeted federally funded science and technology appears to be the
failure to include "knowledge diffusion" policy in the form of a program that links knowledge
"production" with knowledge "utilization."
ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES
CONCERNING COMPETITIVENESS
The thesis of this article is that federally funded STI has the potential to increase U.S.
industrial innovation and productivity, and to maximize the economic competitiveness and
vitality of the country. Our experience as a nation suggests that those federally targeted
science and technology programs considered to be successful recognized the interdependence
of knowledge production and knowledge transfer. There is, however, concern.
Over the past 30 years, more than 50 studies relative to federal STI have been conducted.
These studies raise a number of specific issues and concerns. Recently the U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on
Science, Research, and Technology held hearings on federal STI policy. Joseph G. Coyne,
speaking on behalf of the federal interagency group CENDI (Commerce, Energy, NASA,
and Defense Information), stated the following:
The U.S. does not havean overall[STI] strategy,and it does not have a focal point to develop
one. There are anumberof laws,regulations,and standardsnowunderconsiderationthat could
havea majorimpacton [federal]STI programs.However, at the federallevel, there is no focal
point for coordination,[STl] issue identification,and resolution.''3
There are numerous issues and opportunities associated with Federal STI. Five of those
considered to be most significant in terms of their impact on U.S. competitiveness have
been selected for discussion here.
Issue 1: Knowledge Production and Knowledge Utilization
The U.S. government is the single largest source of STI in the world. The results of this
research are considered by many to be an essential component of the Nation's economic
competitiveness. However, Federal policy makers have been concerned that the informa-
tion created through the billions of dollars spent annually by the federal government is
not well utilized because the transfer process between the producer and user is inadequate.
Dissemination efforts are not viewed as an important component of the R&D process,
and therefore there is a low level of support for knowledge transfer in comparison to
knowledge production. This producer-user disconnect practically guarantees that much of
the Federal investment in creating STI will not bear fruit in terms of tangible products
and innovations. This disconnect stands in stark contrast to the agriculture and aviation
programs.
Enhancing U.S.CompetitivenessThrough FederalScientific and Technical Information 223
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with the recognition by federal
policy makers and lawmakers that federal STI is a critical aspect of the R&D process and
serves a variety of other national goals. Policy makers involved in federal science and
technology programs need to understand the relationship of STI to the R&D process:
knowledge transfer is an inseparable part of R&D, and knowledge transfer must be an in-
tegral part of federal science and technology programs.
Issue 2: federal STI Policy
The federal government has been involved in creating, supporting, and transferring STI
for virtually 200 years. Major changes in that involvement have usually coincided with
times of crisis and military conflict. World War II resulted in an expanded federal role
in science and technology.
The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976
(P.L. 94-282) states that "it is the responsibility of the federal government to promote
prompt, effective, reliable, and systematic transfer of science and technology information TM
The act also states that the federal government has the responsibility not only to coordinate
and unify its own science and technology information systems, but to facilitate the close
coupling of institutional scientific research with commercial application of the useful fin-
dings of science.
Despite such lofty and noble goals, there is general agreement that the federal govern-
ment has no coordinated STI policy, and the problem of coordinating federal STI policy
is still unresolved.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness begins with recognizing (1) the uni-
queness of STI among other types of information, (2) the relationship between U.S. science
policy and U.S. STI policy, and (3) the relationship of the parts of federal STI policy to
the whole of federal STI policy.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) A-130, "Management of Federal Information
Resources" states that the open and efficient exchange of federal STI is important and fosters
excellence. However, A-130 fails to distinguish among types of information (e.g., STI) on
the grounds that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 made no such distinction. Thus
the question of who should perform or provide the service takes precedence over the ser-
vice.
In a narrow sense, federal science policy has helped expand the frontiers of new knowledge
and federal STI policy has promoted the application of new knowledge. A broader use
of federal science and STI policy is to serve various other national goals such as economic
competitiveness.
The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976
(P.L. 94-282) established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). OSTP
serves as a source of judgment for the President and shall advise him of scientific and
technological issues that affect national policy and the economy. P.L. 94-282 gave OSTP
a mandate to promote the transfer and utilization of STI for civilian needs, to consider
the potential role of information technology in the information transfer process, and to co-
ordinate federal STI policies and practices. It is generally agreed that OSTP has not ful-
filled its legislative mandate.
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The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists if the Executive Branch assumes
a leadership role for science and technology to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness.
With the abolishment of the NSF Office of Science Communication and the demise of the
Committee on Scientific and Technical Information (COSATI), OSTP could assume an
institutional leadership position within the Executive Branch or at least provide a coor-
dination function between the Executive Branch agencies and the OMB.
OSTP has provided staff attention to STI matters in the past and has supported activities
of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET).
One effort to remedy the STI policy void has been the formation of CENDI, a group of
STI managers working to develop STI standards and to solve common problems. However,
while the efforts of CENDI are admirable, they fall far short of the coordinated federal
STI policy and policy implementation and oversight needed to help ensure that federal STI
is actively used to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness exists with a more clear
delineation of roles and responsibilities in federal STI policy implementation. For years
the federal government has played an active role in the transfer of federally funded STI.
During the Reagan admires"tration, this active role came under intense criticism and scrutiny,
manifested itself in greater involvement on the part of the private sector in transferring
the results of federally funded STI, and was exemplified by the desire of that administra-
tion to privatize many federal responsibilities and STI activities including the functions
of the National Technical Information Service (NTIS).
Consequently, a significant element of federal STI policy should include the following:
• determination of the players and their respective roles;
• effective working relationships between the public and private sectors;
• a strong coordination function to ensure that the various players carry their respective
roles and responsibilities with optimum efficiency and effectiveness;
• more interactive, user-guided involvement and the removal of "cultural" barriers be-
tween federal STI producers and users; and
• better understanding of users and their values, norms, and communications and
information-seeking and -gathering behavior; knowledge of the users' institutional en-
viroument; and the way(s) in which users typically obtain and use knowledge,
information, and data.
Issue 3: Knowledge Diffusion
There is ample reason for government policy makers to question how effectively and
efficiently federal STI is transferred or diffused to U.S. industry. A large body of knowledge
exists on the topic of knowledge diffusion in agriculture; however, little is known about
the diffusion of knowledge derived from federally funded science and technology. Studies
of federal STI programs and users of federal STI are limited and add little in terms of
understanding the diffusion or transfer process associated with federally funded STI.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with a better understanding of
the knowledge diffusion process as it relates to federal STI. Innovation is a complex pro-
cess composed of multiple and interrelated systems. A better understanding of knowledge
diffusion by federal policymakers, R&D managers, and federal information professionals
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should result in more intelligently designed public policy and programs than could, in turn,
enhance U.S. competitiveness.
Issue 4: Scientific and Technical Information
A model flat depicts the transfer of scientific and technical information in federally funded
aerospace I_D is composed of two parts: the informal, that relies on collegial contacts,
and the formal, that relies on surrogates and information intermediaries to complete the
producer-to-user knowledge transfer process (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. A Model Depicting the Transfer of Federally Funded Aerospace R&D
Framework. The producers are the federal agencies (e.g., NASA) and their contractors
or grantees. The surrogates include the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), the
NASA Scientific and Technical Information Facility (NASA STI Facility), and the NTIS.
The information intermediaries are, in large part, librarians and technical information
specialists in academia, government, and industry.
Information intermediaries who represent knowledge producers are expected to serve
as knowledge brokers or linking agents. Information intermediaries connected with
knowledge users act as technological entrepreneurs or gatekeepers. The effectiveness of
the transfer process is increased if the information intermediaries are active: i.e., they take
information from one place and move it to another, often face to face. The classic example
of an active information intermediary is the agricultural extension agent. Passive informa-
tion intermediaries, on the other hand, simply make the information available, relying on
the initiative of the user to request or search out the information needed.
Assessment. A number of studies in recent years have been specifically concerned with
STI, knowledge transfer, and U.S. industrial competitiveness. They find that knowledge
transfer procedures have not been adopted by federally supported information transfer ac-
tivities, and that dissemination activities are treated as afterthoughts.
Problems exist with the total system as well as with the two parts. The total federal system
of information transfer is passive, fragmented, and unfocused, and has no coherent or syste-
matically designed means of transferring the results of federally funded R&D to the user.
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The problem with the informal part of the system is that from collegial contacts, engineers
and scientists can learn only what their colleagues happen to know. In addition, ample
evidence exists to support the claim that researchers cannot know about or keep up with
all of the research in their specific areas of interest. Like other members of the scientific
community, engineers and scientists are faced with the problem of too much information
to know about, to keep up with, and to screen.
Two problems exist with the formal aspects of the system. First, the formal part of the
system employs one-way source-to-user transmission, which is not responsive to the user
context. Rather, these efforts appear to start with an information system into which they
later try to retrofit the users' requirements. The consensus of the findings from the em-
pirical research is that interactive, two-way communications are required for effective
information transfer.
Second, the formal part of the system relies heavily on the use of information in-
termediaries. The problem in evaluating this is that empirical findings on the effectiveness
of these individuals and the role they play in information transfer are sparse and inconclusive.
Their impact is likely to be strongly conditional and limited to a specific institutional con-
text.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness begins with an understanding of the
federal STI system and component subsystems. Empirical investigations, using innovative
methodologies and rigorous experimental designs, need to be undertaken. The present system
uses one-way source-to-user transmission procedures that do not appear to be responsive
to the user context. These procedures should be replaced by interactive, two-way com-
munication. "Cultural differences," the often-cited impediment to the development of a
two-way exchange between information producers and users, should be reduced wherever
possible.
Issue 5: Open Versus Restricted Access to STI
In his congressional testimony in 1989, Joseph Coyne framed the issues in terms of opened
communication versus restricted access, including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
sensitive but unclassified information, Export Administration Regulations (EAR), and the
International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR). There are two schools of thought regard-
ing the management and sharing of STI resulting from federally funded science and
technology programs.
One school fosters and encourages the unrestricted, full exchange of such information.
Proponents of this approach take the position that only unrestricted flow, complete freedom,
and access to information can ensure vital cross-fertilization of research results among
engineers and scientists, both nationally and internationally. These proponents also state
that a free exchange is vital for the promotion of U.S. competitiveness and innovation. They
emphasize that unrestricted, full exchange of information is a two-way street.
The other school of thought advocates the protection of information by restricting access.
Proponents of this approach believe that the flow of information must be restricted to con-
trol military technology vital to U.S. technological superiority, to protect national defense,
and to prevent technology drafting (following in the tailwind of U.S. technology advances).
This philosopby also claims that protecting information by restricting access promotes U.S.
competitiveness and innovation.
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The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with the recognition that, in simple
truth, no empirical evidence exists that warrants the total adoption of either school of thought.
What is needed is a middle ground, a balanced approach that will protect U.S. national
security and foster U.S. competitiveness in the international marketplace.
The opportunity to enhance U.S. competitiveness exists with an answer to the question
"Does the classification of government-funded R&D, for reasons of national security, actually
restrain the competitiveness and innovativeness of American industry?" The Elliott Report
of 1964 recommended that a mechanism be developed and implemented that will ensure
that classified or otherwise restricted STI, usually in the form of U.S. government technical
reports, does not remain unavailable to American industry any longer than is essential to
the national interest, s To this should be added the need for a program that will work actively
to ensure that declassified and otherwise limited-distribution U.S. government technical
reports are made available to American industry.
CONCLUSION
The federal government spends approximately $60 billion annually but virtually none of
this is for research on how to best transfer the results of federally funded R&D or to assess
the impact of federally funded R&D on U.S. innovation, productivity, and competitiveness.
This low level of funding for knowledge transfer and utilization (compared to knowledge
production) supports the conclusion that knowledge transfer and utilization are not com-
ponents (or simply not important ones) of the R&D process. An alternative conclusion
is that government-funded R&D is simply funded for the sake of R&D; that is, to lay the
groundwork for future technological development and advancement but without any clear
or immediate application or direction in mind.
The American public has the right to expect that the approximately $60 billion spent
each year by the federal government for R&D should somehow support both short- and
long-term national economic goals while increasing the country's competitive position in
the world marketplace. There is general agreement that the results of this expenditure have
the potential to do exactly that. There is also concern that a host of mitigating factors may
be restricting the utilization of federally funded STI, thus limiting industrial productivity
and innovation and inhibiting the economic competitiveness and vitality of the country.
There is general agreement that coherent, systematically designed public policy is needed
for transferring the results of federally funded STI to maximize U.S. economic com-
petitiveness. Such a goal can be reached but it takes the will of a people; the formulation,
implementation, and coordination of Executive Branch policies; and congressional leader-
ship, oversight, and support for the required infrastructure through legislation and
appropriations.
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